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Viewing “historical issues” from a historiographical perspective contributes to illuminating latent alternatives buried in history. From the South Korean standpoint, the issue of “victim” redress pertains not only to the injustices of past colonial rule but also to the domestic challenge of rectifying injustices perpetrated by regimes alienated from the “people.” Conversely, from the perspective of the Japanese government, the issue has been framed as one already resolved within the framework of “postwar” “settlement,” giving rise to structural deterioration in bilateral relations. Nonetheless, during the 1980s, concerning the issues of Korean atomic bomb survivors and the repatriation of Koreans from Sakhalin, the Japanese government, under a bipartisan consensus, actively engaged with these matters as “moral” concerns, and the South Korean side accepted this approach. Behind this development lay the relative weakness of the South Korean government and the dominance of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party at the time (Kimura Kan, Nikkan Rekishi Ninshiki Mondai toha Nani ka [What Is the Japan–South Korea Historical Perception Issue], Minerva Publishing, 2014).

Moreover, the 1965 framework itself allowed for a range of interpretations concerning how to address issues that might later emerge but were not discussed during negotiations, a situation that continues to have ramifications today (Kim Eun-jeong, Nikkan Kokkou Seijouka Koushou no Seijishi [A Political History of the Japan–South Korea Normalization Negotiations], Chikura Shobō). It has also been clarified that when the “comfort women” issue surfaced in the early 1990s, the South Korean government initially intended to resolve it domestically. However, immediately after then-Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi’s January 1992 visit to South Korea, which involved a diplomatic apology, the South Korean position shifted to demand “appropriate compensation” from Japan (Kimura, op. cit.). Kimura further reveals that in February of the same year, Etsuro Totsuka, Deputy Representative of International Educational Development at the UN Human Rights Commission, successfully positioned the comfort women issue as a human rights concern, paving the way for the Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance to speak at the Commission in August.

Such scholarship constitutes the fruit of historical studies that seek to address the emotional dynamics—such as “anger” and “joy”—and the political and diplomatic processes surrounding the values of “human rights” and “prosperity,” as well as the deep historical and social structures underpinning them.

In fact, historical studies of “development” across national borders, conducted with an awareness of human rights and prosperity, have flourished in recent years. Until the late 1960s, “development” generally referred to the increase of a nation’s overall economic wealth, alongside expansions in investment, production, trade, and consumption. It was believed that enlarging the economic pie would eventually benefit society as a whole. However, from the late 1960s onward, increasing disparities within developing countries, exacerbated by corruption, inefficiency, and debt crises, prompted a shift in development policies—from the expansion of national wealth toward the reduction of individual “poverty,” the preservation of “individual dignity,” the improvement of “quality of life,” and, more recently, the promotion of “social participation.”

Meanwhile, certain sociologists, including Ronald Inglehart, have revived a new version of “modernization theory,” positing that without a certain level of material development, individual human rights and values of “self-expression,” such as women’s dignity, cannot become dominant (Sasaki Yutaka, Kaihatsu Enjo ni okeru “Kindaika” to “Kaihatsu” wo meguru Gensetsu no Hensen [Discursive Shifts Surrounding ‘Modernization’ and ‘Development’ in Development Assistance]). These trends in the history of development policy indirectly underscore the indivisibility of prosperity, as symbolized by modernization, and the values of human rights and dignity. Accordingly, the human rights movements in South Korea, advocating for the redress of historical injustices against “victims,” can be situated as an extension of the economic cooperation provided by the United States and Japan since the 1950s, which facilitated the country’s democratization and prosperity.

The persistent emergence of “historical issues” between Japan and South Korea, despite both nations having achieved democratic status, can be attributed to differing discursive structures. In South Korea, the collective memory of national resistance underpins the association between victims and universal values such as human rights and freedom. As a result, what is often characterized broadly as “anti-Japanese sentiment” arises from this historical narrative framework.

Conversely, in Japan, the experience of endogenous modernization since the Meiji Restoration, driven by the hanbatsu oligarchs and regional conservative forces, has given rise to a distinct discursive structure. Here, the collective memory supporting democratic ideals tends to fuse with the societal values of “prosperity” and “peace,” as symbolized by cultural narratives such as Oshin. While the values of human rights, prosperity, and peace should be inherently indivisible, their differential fusion with each nation’s historical memory appears to accelerate intense historical conflicts between Japan and South Korea.

Recognizing the historical processes through which emotions are generated—and situating these emotions in relation to the institutional frameworks of economy and society, as well as the value systems that filter and shape collective memory—enables a deeper awareness of the emotions that operate within both self and society. Facilitating mutual reflection upon these emotions through dialogue, thereby contributing to gradual transformation, constitutes a core task for historiography that aspires toward reconciliation.

Note: This text was originally published in Toki no Hōrei. Minor editorial discrepancies may exist between this version and the published article.