Articles , Books and Media

To conclude this series, I would like to express my personal reflections at last. The issue of historical memory is not merely a matter of the past; it is intrinsically linked to international cooperation concerning the protection of human life, that is, to the domain of security, through the universal value of human rights—or more precisely, through national memories intertwined with that value. This linkage was institutionalized during the early 1990s, spanning from the Miyazawa Cabinet to the Murayama Cabinet (1992–1996). The Japan Socialist Party had once advocated a policy of non-armed neutrality, which presupposed reconciliation with Asian neighbors. Within the coalition government of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Japan Socialist Party, and the Sakigake Party, the Murayama Cabinet secured an agreement whereby the Socialists recognized the Self-Defense Forces, while the Liberal Democrats committed to addressing historical issues as stipulated in the coalition agreement. The Miyazawa faction—ancestral to today’s Kishida and Aso factions—actively engaged with historical issues, symbolized by the Kōno Statement, linking this initiative to the dispatch of PKO forces. The Murayama Statement emerged along this trajectory (cf. “The Historical and Security Linkage” in Series on Japan’s Security, Volume 6: The Korean Peninsula and East Asia, Iwanami Shoten).

Indeed, the final exclusively Liberal Democratic Party administration under Miyazawa for the first time explicitly framed historical consciousness as a matter of international cooperation. Through the “21st Century Japan–Asia Partnership Council,” deliberations were held on how Japan, as a perpetrator, could confront its historical responsibilities and how a new national consensus could be formed to secure trust from Asia.

Nonetheless, backlash ensued. Some schoolteachers and media figures denounced these efforts as attempts to inculcate a “masochistic view of history” that would cast all of Japan’s past in a negative light. Concurrently, in South Korea, the memory of victimhood was sacralized, leading to demands for complete apologies and recognition of governmental “legal responsibility.” Over the past three decades, emotional intensities symbolized by the sacredness of “perpetration” and “victimization” have been incorporated into preexisting national memories in each country, yet without fostering the deeper emotional connections between nations that might have been hoped for.

While the diplomatic normalization of the 1960s and 1970s achieved material economic cooperation and reconstruction, genuine emotional bonds—particularly with regions directly subjected to Japanese colonial rule—remain insufficiently realized.

The era in which Japan stood alone as Asia’s sole industrialized democracy has already passed. It is now evident that grounding human rights and freedoms, as values sustaining democracy, within the historical memories of the nation can strengthen the persuasiveness of human rights diplomacy and enable more effective cooperation with neighboring countries. Absent such an approach, current trends that run counter to these ideals are likely to deepen confusion unless they are corrected by political forces capable of resonating with the deeper emotions of the citizenry.

Between realism and idealism, the memory arises of a particular elderly woman—a former “comfort woman”—who was present during former Prime Minister Abe’s address to the United States Congress. Introduced by Congressman Mike Honda, she listened from the gallery in traditional Korean attire symbolizing the Korean national flag, representing the sufferings of her youth. Abe’s address emphasized universal values of human rights, women’s dignity, and human security as core principles of “proactive pacifism.” Yet it remains a lingering question whether a brief acknowledgment could not have been added, affirming that, to prevent the recurrence of such suffering, Japan and the United States must cooperate.

While Commodore Perry’s arrival in Japan was characterized as an “encounter with democracy,” Abe’s narrative similarly positioned Japan’s wartime deviation as a derailment from the rightful trajectory of democratic growth. The 70th Anniversary Statement acknowledged that the causes of the Pacific War lay in Japan’s aggression toward China and its deviation from international cooperation, thereby “misguidedly” formulating national policy. The Kan Statement on the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II further acknowledged the annexation of Korea as contrary to the principles of human freedom and dignity.

The question thus emerges: how can Japan embed universal values—democracy including “freedom” and “prosperity,” and human rights encompassing women’s dignity—within its own historical experiences, spanning from the arrival of Perry, through the Meiji Restoration, to the present day? The connection between national memory and universal values will become increasingly critical in rebuilding relationships with neighboring nations amid the great transformations of the contemporary era. Just as American presidential speeches are richly woven with historical memories—such as Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and Washington’s Declaration of Independence—serving as foundations for discussions on freedom and democracy, so too must Japan more consciously relate its historical experiences to global and Asian history when articulating its values to the world.

In the cultural sphere as well, phenomena have emerged in the SNS era whereby “bad currency drives out good currency.” Reversing this trend necessitates cooperative cultural policies and demands that domestic cultural policies become living appeals to emotions and memory. The paradoxical expansion of state roles in fields such as industrial technology development and security must likewise serve to invigorate the constituent elements of national democracy, while coordinating efforts to reconcile conflicting values and memories across societies. Creating an environment in which new historical memories and meanings can be properly rooted in history—without directly regulating thought—appears to be the true direction for future international cooperation and global politics. Those interested are encouraged to visit the Wilson Center’s website for further insights.

Note: This text was originally published in Toki no Hōrei. Minor editorial discrepancies may exist between this version and the published article.