Newsletters and Essays

This presentation examines how the memory of the Battle of Okinawa continues to influence the relationship between Okinawa and mainland Japan from both historical and social perspectives.

Okinawa was once an independent nation, the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was invaded by the Satsuma Domain in 1609 and formally annexed by Japan in 1879. Following annexation, Okinawans were subjected to forced assimilation into Japanese society. However, deep-rooted discrimination persisted, and true acceptance by the mainland never materialized. This strained relationship culminated in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, during which over 200,000 people lost their lives, including many civilians and Okinawan-born soldiers. The Japanese military treated Okinawa as a “sacrificial stone” for the defense of the mainland, prohibiting civilians from surrendering and encouraging mass suicides, subjecting them to extremely harsh conditions.

The memory of this wartime experience remains deeply embedded in Okinawan society and is closely tied to the ongoing issue of U.S. military bases. Okinawa hosts most U.S. military facilities in Japan, and the overlap between wartime trauma and present-day militarization is clear. Local slogans such as “To remember the Battle of Okinawa is to eliminate the bases” reflect how memory is intertwined with political expression.

The presenter argues that genuine reconciliation requires face-to-face dialogue and mutual understanding. From the philosophical perspective of “sacrifice and the sacrificed,” it is crucial to recognize the recurring burden placed on Okinawa by national policies. Acts such as the Imperial Family’s visits to Okinawa and the participation of mainland Japanese in anti-base protests represent possible first steps toward reconciliation.

In conclusion, the presenter asserts that true reconciliation demands sustained efforts through education, policymaking, and media engagement. The memory of the Battle of Okinawa is not merely a remembrance of past tragedy—it is a political act that challenges the ongoing inequalities faced by Okinawan society today.

Regarding my presentation, Professor Hunmi Lee of Sogang University offered the following comments. Professor Lee suggested that, beyond the visible resistance of the anti-base movement, it might be possible to identify more subtle forms of resistance among the people of Okinawa. She pointed out that James C. Scott’s concept of “hidden transcripts” could potentially be applied to the Okinawan context as well.

In response to Professor Lee’s comments, I pointed out that the concept of “hidden transcripts” can indeed often be observed in Okinawa’s history. One clear example is music. Okinawan songs are known for their beautiful melodies, which at first glance might seem to celebrate the island’s scenic beauty. However, a closer look at the lyrics reveals that many of these songs convey the pain and suffering experienced during the Battle of Okinawa. A representative example is the song Gettō (“Shell Ginger”), written by Okinawan musician Yutaka Umisedo in 1982—ten years after Okinawa’s “reversion” to Japan.

At the time, people in Okinawa lived in an era when it was still difficult to clearly define whether “reversion” was good or bad. Even decades after the war, openly discussing the war without pressure remained challenging. Through Gettō, Umisedo expresses a yearning for peace by evoking local Okinawan imagery—both the native plant shell ginger and landscapes associated with the war.

This example demonstrates how music can serve as a gentle medium through which people confront the wounds of war when direct expression is too difficult. It also reflects an implicit critique of the fact that, despite Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, the military bases remain. In this way, songs like Gettō and the anti-base movement can be seen as two sides of the same coin—both forms of response by the people of Okinawa to the lasting trauma of war.

On the other hand, another question came to mind. When discussing the relationship or reconciliation between Okinawa and mainland Japan (perhaps including Taiwan, where I am from), a frequent point of contention is the seemingly irreconcilable contradiction between Okinawa’s demand for peace and demilitarization, and mainland Japan’s (and Taiwan’s) demand for national security and independence.

To put it more precisely, the security sought by mainland Japan (and Taiwan) is one of protection from external invasion, whereas Okinawa’s demand for peace and demilitarization can be interpreted as a desire for safety from the violence of foreign troops currently stationed in Okinawa. How can these two forms of security coexist? A clear fact is that when Tokyo shifts the cost of pursuing national security onto Okinawan society, it undermines the possibility of reconciliation between mainland Japan and Okinawa.

On this point, I was reminded of the concept presented by Professor Leiner of the University of Jena in his keynote lecture at the IARS. Professor Leiner pointed out that while reconciliation can sometimes lead to a more secure society (as in Rwanda), in other cases it does not (as in South Africa). So, when considering the relationship between mainland Japan (or Taiwan) and Okinawa, how the respective concerns around “security” are addressed in a way that respects both sides is an important issue in achieving reconciliation. Ideally, both forms of security would be ensured, and peaceful coexistence could be realized—but how this can be practically achieved remains a question worthy of deep reflection.